



After modest signs of détente on the Korean peninsula in 2014 and early 2015, the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has reverted to form in 2016, erupting 
with a spasm of nuclear and missile tests. Consequently tension on the peninsula 
has ratcheted back up to extremely elevated levels, and the international community 
has scrambled to respond with sanctions. Moreover, the recent cycle of tension is not 
finished as the Pyongyang regime has promised more provocations and retaliation 
for perceived threats. 
As the DPRK is celebrating a rare Worker’s Party Congress, it is worthwhile to consid-
er how its recent nuclear weapon developments are influencing regional and global 
security. Indeed the most recent round of DPRK provocations—and the international 
community’s response—has an impact on European security. In this policy brief I ex-
amine the current state-of-play of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programmes, and 
then discuss how it affects the European security equation and demands reflection 
by strategic thinkers throughout Europe.
The DPRK’s nuclear programme
Analysis of the DPRK’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile arsenals must start from 
the fact that the country’s post-2000 development of these capabilities represents a 
signal failure of international non-proliferation efforts. Under Kim Jong Il the Pyong-
yang regime made slow but steady progress on nuclear warhead design and produc-
tion derived from reprocessed plutonium removed from an experimental reactor at 
the country’s Yongbyon facility. Parallel to this programme, DPRK scientists pursued 
an enrichment system (acquired from Pakistan in exchange for missile technology) 
to produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU), a worrisome development given the 
country’s uranium mines. Over the same period, Pyongyang made advances to the 
country’s strategic and tactical missile and rocket programmes, including acceler-
ated testing of specific systems and improvements in facilities, launch capabilities, 
and command-and-control. 
The plutonium programme resulted in increasingly successful nuclear bomb test 
detonations in 2006 and 2009, while uncertainty remains about the type of nu-
clear fuel in the test detonations carried out in 2013 (plutonium or WGU) and 2016 
(plutonium, WGU, or hydrogen isotopes). Independent experts currently estimate 
the DPRK’s plutonium-based arsenal at 6-8 weapons; beyond this, the DPRK has 
plutonium stockpiles sufficient to construct additional warheads (Albright 2015; 
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ACA 2016). The warhead output of the uranium-based fissile material produc-
tion programme is opaque—given uncertainty about the number and operation of 
requisite gas centrifuges—but estimates are 4-8 devices (Wit and Ahn 2015). Thus 
the current state of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is likely 10-16 working devices, 
with an additional capacity for producing “nuclear weapons equivalents” based 
on fissile material from continued plutonium reprocessing and/or the advanced 
uranium enrichment programme. 
Two other DPRK nuclear weapons developments are noteworthy. First, the Kim 
Jong Un regime asserts that the 2016 test detonation was a thermonuclear (hy-
drogen) bomb, which, if true, would represent a qualitative advance in DPRK 
nuclear bomb technology (as measured in blast yield and sophistication). How-
ever, the absence of measured radionuclides undermines this claim, especially as 
seismic measurements of the 2016 test equaled 5.1MMS, corresponding to the 
6-9Kt yield of the 2013 atomic test explosion. These data are inconsistent with 
a thermonuclear test, even given uncertainty about the test’s geological fac-
tors. The reigning hypothesis is that the DPRK tested a “boosted fission” device, 
which would nonetheless mean the country’s nuclear scientists are continuing 
to improve warhead design. 
Second, the Kim Jong Un leadership states that it has successfully miniatur-
ized nuclear warheads to fit on short-range (SRBM), medium-range (MRBM), 
intermediate-range (IRBM), and long-range/intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(LRBM/ICBM). If true, this would be a crucial step in building a useable nuclear 
capability. In March 2016 Kim released a photograph of himself standing next 
to a small, spherical warhead mock-up. The DPRK’s advance in miniaturization 
cannot be confirmed, and device reliability would be compromised, as the regime 
has presumably not live-tested a miniaturized bomb. Still, independent analysts, 
US generals, and the ROK government argue that a working miniaturized war-
head—fitted to intermediate-range Nodong-class missiles, and possibly onto 
ICBMs—is feasible for the DPRK (Bender 2015; Choe 2016). 
Accompanying nuclear bomb development, the DPRK has conducted a series of 
missile and rocket tests. These range from reliable single-stage SRBMs, MRBMs, 
and IRBMs (notably the Nodong-series missiles) to more unreliable but power-
ful multi-stage LRBMs/ICBMs and space launch vehicles. In addition, the DPRK 
is developing road-mobile ICMBs (KN-08/KN-14) and IRBMs (BM25-Musudan). 
There is widespread agreement that the DPRK’s Strategic Rocket Forces control 
approximately one thousand deployed SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs with ranges 
covering the Korean peninsula, Japan, and Western Pacific targets; and its small 
quantity of ICBMs can likely strike the US mainland, although there is skepticism 
regarding these missiles’ reliability and accuracy (Bender 2015; NTI 2016; Schil-
ling 2016). The reliability and accuracy issues are especially significant regarding 
the ability of the intercontinental projectiles to convey a miniaturized nuclear 
warhead through the rigours of atmospheric re-entry. 
The combination of a functional, miniaturized nuclear warhead and a ballistic 
missile delivery system gives the DPRK a crude but credible nuclear deterrent. 
Still, questions remain regarding the arsenal’s strategic sophistication: e.g., the 
capability/quantity of road-mobile systems, quality and location of hardened 
silos, progress on SLBMs (submerged-/-submarine launch ballistic missiles), and 
ability to deploy solid-fuel projectiles. Finally, there is uncertainty in the projec-
tion of the size and capability of the DPRK’s future arsenal. The best-known 
estimates for 2020 predict a lower-end of 20 weapons and marginally improved 
delivery systems; a median of 50 weapons and emergency operational KN-08 
and Musudan missiles; and a high-end of 100 weapons and normally operational 
KN-08/KN-14 and Musudan missiles (Wit and Ahn 2015). 
The main reaction to these developments has been new sanctions by the inter-
national community, including China; they are the stiffest ever, targeting in-
dustries (coal, shipping, etc.), institutions, and individuals. Yet there remains a 
gap between the gravity of DPRK nuclear development and the countervailing 
actions of global society. The DPRK’s capability threat is aggravated by uncer-
tainty about Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy and doctrine. Regime officials say 
they understand the country’s nuclear deterrent as modeled on the logic of mu-
tually assured destruction. This is troubling—the symmetry underlying MAD is 
absent with the DPRK vis-à-vis the US. Among other factors, this is because 
the DPRK will not have a credible second-strike capability. At such a primitive 
stage of nuclear arsenal development, the regime would have an incentive to 
use its weapons before losing them to a strike. Moreover the regime has avowed 
a “defensive-use-only” policy, yet also bombastically asserted a right to “use-it-
or-lose-it” pre-emptive nuclear attack, if it considered either regime survival or 
its deterrent capability threatened. 
The DPRK has developed nuclear weapons for numerous reasons: (a) maximiz-
ing coercive diplomatic leverage and thus output from international negotia-
tions, as well as framing potential DPRK-ROK reunification in a favorable way; 
(b) provoking international tensions on the Korean peninsula in order to drive 
wedges between the US, China, and the ROK; (c) possessing a deterrent against 
conventional attack; (d) escalating to a limited nuclear conflict in the case of 
imminent regime collapse due to conventional military inferiority (an “escalate 
to de-escalate” strategy)(Smith 2015). This would entail use of theatre SRBMs, 
MRBMs, and IRBMs, rather than strategic missiles. This implies a distinction in 
Pyongyang’s regard toward strategic and operational nuclear missiles, the pos-
sibility of making first-use of the weapons for tactical or deterrence (“escalation 
to de-escalate”) reasons, and thus a higher chance of the weapons’ use. This is 
obviously worrisome.
Implications for European Security
All these developments carry security consequences for Europe. Four scenarios 
in particular are worth highlighting. (a) the possibility, in the short-term, of 
increased arms (especially NBCR) proliferation from the DPRK to other parts of 
the world, such as the MENA; (b) in the medium-term US focus on the DPRK 
will further the reality that “rebalancing” to East Asia distracts it from attending 
well enough to European security concerns; (c) also in the medium-term, US 
reassurance of the ROK and Japan may be insufficient to preclude them from 
developing indigenous nuclear deterrents, which would damage global non-pro-
liferation; (d) continued, sharpened criticism of human rights abuses in the DPRK 
can and should be treated by the EU and its member states as low-hanging fruit 
in the fight to improve the DPRK’s human and hard security situations. 
To be more precise:
(a) The DPRK is a proliferator of both conventional and nonconventional arms—
as well as technical expertise and fissionable material—to states throughout 
Europe’s border areas (especially the MENA). DPRK scientists helped Syria build 
(and supplied nuclear material for) its Al-Kibar nuclear reactor. Other clients 
have included Libya, Yemen, Hezbollah, and Iran. These countries have ready 
contact to DPRK regime elements connected with various conventional and non-
conventional arms sales. With the MENA in disarray, leaders of fragile states and 
violent extremist groups in Europe’s neighborhood are attractive markets for a 
DPRK regime with limited opportunities for earning foreign exchange. 
This will likely continue despite—even because of—the 2016 promulgation of 
UNSCR 2270, which tightened and added sanctions. DPRK arms flowing into the 
MENA will destabilise the region even further, which means greater conflict risk 
on Europe’s southern edge and greater possibilities for violent extremist devel-
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opment coupled to greater access to arms (even potentially NBCR weapons). To 
counteract this, the EU and its member states should (a) enhance intelligence 
on (and interdiction of) DPRK-MENA proliferation networks, and (b) insist on ty-
ing aid/development for MENA countries to their enforcement of UNSCR 2270, 
especially concerning mandatory inspections of DPRK cargo ships. 
(b) The US foreign/security policy community and military are stretched thin, as 
they are dealing with the aforementioned MENA chaos and a rising China with 
revisionist designs in the Indo-Pacific and Central Asia. A belligerent, doctrinally 
opaque, nuclear-weapon capable DPRK adds a new dimension of security threat 
in Northeast Asia, complicates the already difficult US-China relationship, and 
obliges Washington to spend resources managing alliances with the ROK and 
Japan.  
There is little reason to think this situation will change in the near-/mid-term. 
Consequently the US will have less bandwidth to provide security in Europe’s 
neighborhood. Diplomatically the EU and member states are capable of meet-
ing the challenge posed by less US security engagement in/around Europe. The 
situation is less sanguine in terms of power projection, even in its own neigh-
bourhood. Both the EU and member states face deficits in deployment levels, 
materiel, airlift/air-support/air-refueling, and electronic warfare. Without the 
US it would be difficult for European forces to counter– in a non-NATO country 
like Sweden, for example – the kind of aggression that Russia exacted against 
Ukraine or Georgia. Such a scenario seems fanciful, but Russia’s revanchisme has 
resurrected European geopolitics. Thus, at the least, EU member states need to 
prioritize (a) budgetary commitments to hard security, while (b) the EU should 
improve the ability to pool/share resources, make decisions efficiently about 
where/when to use them, and have them readily prepared for operations. 
(c) There is no guarantee that future US leaders will succeed in reassuring the 
ROK and Japanese governments that they do not need their own nuclear deter-
rent in the face of DPRK threats. The key in this regard is, obviously, whether 
US extended deterrence is sufficiently credible to persuade its Northeast Asian 
allies not to withdraw from their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). Indeed the US is struggling to accomplish this essential task of alliance 
management (Jackson 2016). To wit: (a) B-52 flyovers (an extended deterrence 
index) after DPRK nuclear and missiles tests are assurance measures increas-
ingly discounted by the ROK and Japan; (b) US extended deterrence does not 
affect the low-end provocations threatening these two countries; and (c) the 
DPRK has committed more than 1,000 small-scale attacks against the ROK since 
the 1960s, most of which were not met with a response in kind (ibid.). At some 
point there is a significant probability that the ROK and Japan say “enough” and 
develop their own nuclear weapons. ROK President Park Geun Hye has already 
evoked this possibility, saying in 2014 that another DPRK nuclear test would be 
“crossing a Rubicon…, [making it] difficult for us to prevent a nuclear domino 
from occurring in this area.”  
With the 2016 nuclear test, the Rubicon is forded. The nuclearisation scenario 
would likely unfold through either Japan or the ROK invoking NPT Article X, 
followed almost inexorably by the neighbouring state. Weaponisation would be 
rapid. Japan is a threshold nuclear state, and the ROK’s civilian nuclear, engi-
neering, and military-industrial sectors also give it status as a latent nuclear 
state. The EU and its member states – as good international citizens, supporters 
of international institutions/regimes, and polities with vital economic and secu-
rity interests in a stable, peaceful world – should work to obviate this possibility. 
Indeed the described nuclearisation scenario could entail the development and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in states in Europe’s neighbourhood (e.g., Tur-
key, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ukraine, etc.). In practice, the EU and its nuclear-
club member states can make several – admittedly marginal – contributions: 
(a) promoting Northeast Asian regional integration (e.g., the Northeast Asian 
Peace and Cooperation Initiative) and confidence-building measures; (b) using 
diplomatic channels to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime; (c) accept-
ing an increase in the amount of reprocessed plutonium that Japan and the ROK 
can send for storage to France and Great Britain (thus limiting the theoretical 
amount of fissile material that would be quickly available for nuclear warhead 
construction). 
(d) A small but meaningful European security policy response to the DPRK nu-
clear conundrum would be to increase pressure on the country for its human 
rights abuses. Indeed there is a direct link between human security abuses in and 
hard security threats emanating from the DPRK. Most infamously, various types 
of prisoners (including political prisoners) labour as slaves in horrific camps for 
the benefit of the DPRK military, including its missile/rocket forces. It is less well 
known that thousands of DPRK citizens toil as near-slaves overseas to earn and 
remit foreign exchange, some of which is diverted to military use. This source of 
hard currency – roughly US $ 2 billion annually – may become more important 
to Pyongyang’s leaders as sanctions begin to hit harder. Currently most of these 
“workers” are in the mining, logging, construction, and textile sectors in coun-
tries like China and Russia, but both Poland and Malta have received a small 
number of such labourers. 
Recently the EU has played a role in the international condemnation of DPRK 
human rights abuses, including UN resolutions co-sponsored with Japan. As a 
practical matter this forces the DPRK’s leadership to either expend resources 
defending itself (which also distracts it from other mischief) or tacitly accept 
opprobrium that makes it even less likely to bring in FDI or secure other inter-
national support. Additionally, however, the EU and its member states should 
(within their competences) consider (a) policies such as the refusal of imported 
goods/commodities produced with DPRK seconded-labour, (b) penalties for Eu-
ropean companies that use such labour either within or outside the EU, and (c) 
a tailored ban on seconded-worker permits fitting the profile of DPRK slave-
labourers (i.e., permits allowing payments into escrow funds controlled by the 
state). 
The DPRK nuclear weapons programme has many facets to which Europe is ill-
equipped to respond. But it does not follow that Europe cannot do anything. It is 
also true that the EU and its member states face extraordinary, acute challenges 
both domestically and from the European neighbourhood. But it does not follow 
that the EU and its member states cannot examine other regions of the world, or 
think now about contributions to solving chronic problems that might become 
acute later. Indeed this is one component of strategy. Europe should embrace it 
with respect to the DPRK. Not doing so is both a failure to meet its own stand-
ards of international engagement, and a foolhardy oversight that will become 
more erroneous over time.
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